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2Abstract
We study competitive equilibria with moral hazard in economies with ag-
gregate risk and where trading occurs with an incomplete set of …nancial as-
sets. The main conclusion of the paper is that, contrary to the individual risk
economies, moral hazard is compatible with trading in competitive linear …nancial
contracts, and gives rise to no manipulation problem. We establish existence of
nonmanipulable equilibria provided that there are no relative price e¤ects (e.g. a
one-commodity economy), and that …nancial markets display nonlinearly homo-
geneous payo¤s (e.g., nominal), and are su¢ciently incomplete. Finally, we justify
the linear contract as the optimal pricing schedule in a speci…c trading game with
an auctioneer. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D50, D82.
31. Introduction
When economic agents are asymmetrically and privately informed, optimal ex-
clusive contracts generally entail unavoidable nonlinearities.1 If contracts are
nonexclusive, Helpman and La¤ont [9], Cresta [7] and more recently Bisin and
Gottardi [3] suggest that nonlinearities are necessary even if the contract itself is
not optimally designed. As a result, principals (…rms) do not have access to linear
hedging instruments in these models, and …nancial markets display nonlinearities
to overcome the manipulation problem.2 This is a strong negative conclusion
on the viability of linear …nancial hedging instruments in the presence of moral
hazard, and the goal of this paper is to …nd out conditions under which such a
conclusion is reversed.
All this literature on adverse selection and moral hazard within a general equi-
librium framework (see also Prescott and Townsend [19]) models the uncertainty
a¤ected by the private information as individual risk.3 We claim here that, if risk
is not individual, nonlinearity is not necessary for the absence of manipulation on
…nancial markets. With e¤ort decisions a¤ecting aggregate risk, it may happen
that informed traders do not want to trade upon their information in equilibrium.
We introduce a model of competitive …nancial market interaction where there is
moral hazard, and where the risk a¤ected by the private action is not individ-
ual, but aggregate. E¤ort decisions may a¤ect aggregate risk in economies where
entrepreneurs sell claims on the pro…ts they make to the market, or trade in …-
nancial assets whose payo¤s are correlated with their pro…ts (such as derivative
1By exclusive we mean a contract that cannot be transferred, or such that no other contract
with third parties can be written by the parties involved (in particular, by the informed party),
or that otherwise has terms depending on the parties’ activities outside the contract. An optimal
exclusive contract is objective-maximizing for the uninformed trader (the contract-designer). By
linear we mean a contract where its terms (prices and payo¤s) do not depend on the quantities
exchanged (the number of contracts purchased or sold). Note that the contract dependence on
private information (separating contract) usually implies nonlinearities in prices.
2Indeed, a more direct way of incorporating borrowing and lending with moral hazard and
competitive commodity markets is to model the …nancial contract as nonlinear from the start.
This is essentially the approach taken by Prescott and Townsend [19] and by Bennardo [2] and
Lisboa [14] for the case of zero-pro…t contracts, and by Citanna and Villanacci [5] when contracts
may yield positive pro…t or utility to the principals.
3An important exception is La¤ont [13], which shows existence of fully revealing incentive
compatible rational expectations equilibrium. Hence it can be seen as a model of adverse
selection and aggregate risk. However, La¤ont assumes the existence of a continuum of agents
identical in type, whereas here we will not.
4instruments), or else, in economies where individual risks are correlated. Such
economies have been previously studied in a partial equilibrium framework by
Jensen and Meckling [11], among others, and by Kihlstrom and Matthews [12]
in a simpli…ed general equilibrium setup, lately extended by Magill and Quinzii
[15]. All these models, however, assume nonlinear pricing or nonlinear price con-
jectures. Instead, our simple but key observation is that with aggregate risk
and incomplete …nancial assets, the asset real payo¤s are generally determined
in equilibrium, since generally budget constraints are not linearly homogeneous
in commodity prices. In equilibrium, asset payo¤s may adjust to make …nancial
contracts manipulation-free even if asset prices are linear and so are conjectures.
For simplicity of the analysis, we will focus on the case where assets are nomi-
nal. In these economies and with incomplete …nancial markets there is endogenous
uncertainty, that is, uncertainty regarding the future equilibrium spot price level,
a phenomenon also known as indeterminacy, using a more structural language.4
Because of this additional uncertainty, common to both the uninformed and the
informed trader, when …nancial markets are su¢ciently incomplete (and assets
have nominal returns) we show that with only one commodity there is enough
noise in the equilibrium price system to conceal the information (based on trade
or price observation, the uninformed cannot tell what action the informed trader
has chosen). At the same time, the informed trader is also uncertain regarding
the future and values the asset identically no matter what e¤ort has been exerted.
In other words, while the information remains concealed, it is depleted of value in
trading the …nancial assets, so that trade occurs without manipulation. Of course,
other equilibria may arise where prices di¤er across e¤ort realizations, assuming
that these prices have the property of being incentive compatible from the in-
formed trader’s viewpoint. However, this property is not general in these models
(see Blume and Easley, [4]), and this is why we concentrate on equilibria where
prices are constant with respect to e¤ort. Moreover, equilibria where prices reveal
e¤ort choices can be also modeled as equilibria with nonlinear price conjectures as
in Kihlstrom and Matthews [12], partly losing their appeal if our goal is to study
linear pricing with moral hazard.
We conclude that there cannot be any manipulation, since either information is
truthfully revealed, so that the informational asymmetry disappears in equilibrium
4Moreover, if one eliminated the indeterminacy in the model via the introduction of money
(see Magill and Quinzii [16]), one could think that these equilibria can be the result of a monetary
policy constrained by the linearity of contracts (no interference with the pricing mechanism) and
the incentive compatibility of the outcome, rather than the result of price level uncertainty.
5and, with it, the moral hazard problem, or it is not revealed, but then informed
traders cannot use the information to manipulate the …nancial contract.
Our view of this solution goes through an existence proof for strong fully
nonrevealing equilibria, that is, for equilibria which are fully nonrevealing in the
usual sense, and where additionally tomorrow commodity prices do not reveal
signals chosen by informed traders.5 As an additional feature of these equilibria,
informed traders choose the signal, as opposed to passively receiving it. These
equilibria are technically an extension of a result by Polemarchakis and Siconol…
[18].
In the existing literature on informed trading, our paper mostly resembles
Dow and Gorton [8], Kihlstrom and Matthews [12], and Magill and Quinzii [15].
With the …rst, it shares the goal of obtaining nonrevelation of private and ex post
unveri…able information without making use of exogenous noise. It di¤ers in the
results, in particular since we get informed trading which nevertheless is not prof-
itable. With the second two papers, ours shares the interest in modelling moral
hazard in competitive equilibrium with aggregate risk. The issue of price-taking
behavior is usually seen as a major hurdle for applying competitive models à la
Arrow-Debreu to the analysis of moral hazard.6 Kihlstrom and Matthews solve
the conceptual issue by assuming that the uninformed trader can infer from the
quantity traded the e¤ort exerted, and that the assets value depends monoton-
ically on the quantity sold by the informed agent. Magill and Quinzii develop
this idea into a fully-‡edged general equilibrium model, and derive some other
conclusions along the lines of real payo¤ determination, highlightling the role of
options in creating the appropriate managerial incentives. In our model, because
of nonrevelation, the link between quantity traded, e¤ort and price is broken, and
we argue that price may be correctly conjectured not to depend on the quantity
exchanged by the informed trader, modulo the usual ‘irrationality’ of price-taking
behavior as in standard models.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 introduce the model setup, the existence proof and its ex-
tension to the case when the informed trader is himself a principal hiring a worker
who exerts unobservable e¤ort. This version of the paper considers economies
with one informed trader (possibly with his agent/worker) and one uninformed
5This is required to embed the standard principal-agent relation in a general equilibrium
economy, since if prices tomorrow were e¤ort-dependent, the compensation scheme could also
depend on e¤ort, a situation ruled out by assumption in the standard model.
6For example, Radner ([20], [21]), introducing his notion of competitive equilibrium with
sequential markets, limits its applicability to situations in which states of the world can always
be veri…ed ex post, ruling out by …at embedding the moral hazard problem into his model.
6trader, but results can easily be extended to the general case of many principal-
agent pairs, and many uninformed traders. The extension in Section 4 is key to
show the link with the principal-agent literature. In a principal-agent model, can
a …rm/principal hedge against risks on …nancial markets, when investors cannot
observe the worker/agent’s compensation scheme? The canonical answer is yes,
(a) through a riskfree asset (but hedging is very limited, of course; see implicitly
or explicitly most of the partial equilibrium literature on contracts where no limit
is imposed on wages o¤ered by a principal) ; or (b) provided the contract is non-
linear (another principal-agent contract, where the principal is the bank lending
money) ; or (c) provided the investor understands the relation between choice
of e¤ort and …nancial structure of the …rm (in particular, retained equity à la
Jensen and Meckling [11]). In this case, a nonlinear ’price conjecture’ is formed.
Our answer is yes, even if the contract is linear (i.e., borrowing on …nancial mar-
kets and not through a bank, say ; this is what we have in mind here), provided
the contract has payo¤s nonlinearly homogenous in prices (e.g., nominal, like a
bond), and markets are su¢ciently incomplete. Nevertheless, it should be noticed
that our equilibria are not necessarily low-e¤ort equilibria, and that contrary to
solution (a), the asset is not risk-free.
In our de…nition of equilibrium the informed trader does not control the
amount of information revelation through prices, but takes it as given, and we
intentionally limit the uninformed agent’s knowledge of the structure of the econ-
omy, and in particular, of the informed traders’ payo¤s. To justify the price-taking
assumption, we complete the paper by discussing the informed traders’ strategic
use of their private information. In order to address this issue, we assume common
knowledge of the structure of the economy, and formalize the uninformed traders’
ignorance of the informed traders’ payo¤ as incomplete information regarding the
cost of e¤ort. In particular, we allow the uninformed traders to have complete
ignorance of the e¤ect of the private action on the trader’s utility: the uninformed
traders do not even know whether it is relatively costlier to exert one action over
the other. The model has then hidden-action and hidden-information moral haz-
ard. This also formalizes the fact that in Section 2, 3 and 4 it is assumed that
the uninformed traders cannot invert the informed trader’s best response. In Sec-
tion 5 they can invert, but the best response function is not one-to-one: knowing
prices and the informed trader’s optimal quantities the uninformed trader cannot
…nd out what e¤ort has been chosen. We …rst extend our proof of existence of
equilibria in these incomplete information economies (Section 5), and then show
that our equilibrium allocations are weakly implementable (Section 6).
7Finally, in Section 6 we also present an alternative trading game where the
mechanism designer is a pure clearing house, and show that our equilibrium alloca-
tion is also one of this game (pure strategy) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Although the main point of the paper is not to investigate the optimality of these
linear contracts, the conclusion on the consistency of linear …nancial contracts
and moral hazard is shown to be sustainable in some strategic environment, and
we explain linearities as the result of optimal equilibrium behavior, although not
in the usual sense of maximizing the utility of the uninformed trader(s).
2. The model
The following setup is used in the paper.
Time, uncertainty and information structure
In a …nite horizon economy, with two periods denoted by t = 0;1 let 1 >
S > 1 be the states of the world in t = 1: There are H = 2 traders, and trader 1
has private information about an action he takes and that a¤ects the probability
distribution of future states.7 We assume that trader 1’s private action is discrete,
and denote it by n; with n 2 N = f1;2g: In general, N could be any …nite set.
We interpret n = 1 as ‘low’, and n = 2 as ‘high’. Trader 1’s action a¤ects
the probability distribution over the future states of the world in a …rst order
stochastic dominance sense with respect to the natural order of the states, which
may coincide with the endowment levels of individuals. Let ¼s;n = ¼(sjn) be the





all s0 2 S; with a strict inequality for some s0, and we assume that ¼s;n > 0; all
s;n. This is common knowledge.
Trader 2 has no private information, and instead has a prior distribution over
trader 1’s actions N; denoted by ¼n
2: At this point, we do not assume that trader
2, the uninformed trader, knows the informed trader’s preferences. We take N as
a primitive from the uninformed trader’s perspective. All the information h = 2
7The restriction on H is not essential, in the sense that we could easily deal with the case of
many uninformed agents. Removing the assumption of a unique informed trader entails slightly
changing the existence proof and it is not done in this paper. Interpreting H as types is also
possible, in the sense of having many identical individuals of type 2. The type interpretation is
indeed used as a justi…cation for the price-taking behavior assumption adopted in the usual sense.
However, having many identical individuals of type 1 is not a straightforward extension. To have
many identical type-1 individuals is more problematic, since one has to impose restrictions on
the way each individual’s e¤ort a¤ects the outcome s relative to other individuals’.
8has is market-related: prices, the price function, and possibly information deriving
from understanding that markets clear. Further in the paper, when addressing
issues of incentive compatibility, we will let the uninformed trader understand
the structure of the economy, making a common knowledge assumption on the
structure of the economy and specifying his knowledge of preferences and a prior
on them, as opposed to over the action taken by the informed trader. Our notion of
equilibrium at this point does not depend on this common knowledge assumption,
and it is based on the tradition of competitive analysis of restricting to a minimum
the traders’ knowledge.
We therefore assume that ¼n
2 > 0; for all n; to avoid arbitrage problems.
To denote the traders’ information via partitions of N, we use the symbol Lh:




h ¸ 0;n = 1;2g to denote the space of mixed strategies over
actions for h = 1; and the space of prior beliefs for h = 2 (where we restrict our
attention to strictly positive beliefs). Finally, let ¦ denote the set of conditional
probabilities ¼s;n:
Financial markets
Traders can exchange I …nancial assets, with S > I ¸ 2, making trade plans at
time t = 0 contingent upon their information. Then bn
h 2 RI represents portfolio
holdings if action n occurs, and bh = (b1
h;::;bN
h ): Let qn 2 RI be the price vector
of these assets. Also, let q = (q1;::;qN); and let
J(q) = #Imq; and Nj = fn 2 N j q
n = qjg; all j = 1;2;:::;J(q):
Finally, let Lh(q) = Lh _fNjg
J(q)
j=1 be the join of the private information partition
and the price-induced partition. We will assume that traders use this information
to make decisions. Hence traders’ demand for assets must be Lh(q)¡ measur-
able. To simplify notation, we denote by ¼n
2 also the posterior of trader 2 after
observation of prices.
The assets are identi…ed by an action-independent S £ I payo¤ matrix Y;
expressed in units of account: We assume that Y > 0 and that Y is in general
position, so that in particular rank Y = I. To allow a straightforward comparison
with the insurance contracts of the individual risk models, we could assume that
the price q is paid in the future upon realization of the state s. This would
make the asset spanning endogenous, and the analysis would be complicated by
the need of establishing generic existence through the application of an otherwise
well-known technique. To focus instead on existence issues related to the moral
9hazard problem only, we assume that q is paid today.8
Preferences and endowments
Each trader has preferences over future consumption of C commodities in each
state-action pair. We assume that the commodity space is RC
++: Trader 1 incurs
a cost an
1 for choosing action n; and we assume that this cost is increasing with
n. Preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
vh : R
CSN
++ £ ¦h £ ¦ ! R







h ) ¡ an
h]; [let an
2 ´ 0; all n] where
uh : RC
++ ! R is a smooth, di¤erentially strictly increasing, di¤erentially strictly
concave function with closure of its indi¤erence curves contained in the positive
orthant. This amounts to risk aversion of traders, and to preferences (uh) which
are state-action independent, a standard assumption which will be key for the
results of Section 5
As for notation, we will write vh(xh;¼h;¼;Lh(q)) to stress the fact that prob-
abilities ¼n










++ has typical ele-
ment x
s;n;c





h ); and xh = (x1
h;::;xN
h ): Notice that we posit
that there is no consumption at time t = 0: Endowments are assumed to be
action-independent, i.e. eh 2 RCS
++: Let E = RCSH
++ be the endowment space.
Hereafter, we will assume that C = 1: This assumption is similar to the di-
mensionality condition in rational expectations equilibrium models, and it plays
a fundamental role in the existence proof.
Equilibrium
Let p 2 RCSN
++ be the time t = 1 commodity price vector (keeping in mind that
p 2 R2S
++; since C = 1 and N = 2). Let zh = xh ¡eh: An economy will be a point
(e;a;u;¼;¼2;Y ) 2 E £ R
2£U £ ¦ £ ¦2 £ R
SI
+
where U is the space of utilities u = (u1;:::;uH). In what follows (a;u;¼;¼2;Y )
are kept …xed. An economy is parametrized only by endowments. Let £ = E be
the parameter space, with µ an economy: Let ªn be a standard S £SC matrix of
prices, if action n occurs.
A vector (¼1;(xh;bh)H
h=1;p;q) is a private action equilibrium for an economy
if:
8When insurance contracts are considered, we can have I = 1. Indeed, this was the case
analyzed in a previous version of the paper.







1 = Y bn
1 for all n
and b1 is L1(q)¡measurable;
(U) given p and q; and prior (or revised) beliefs ¼n






2 = Y bn
2 for all n
and b2 is L2(q)¡measurable;
(M) markets clear, that is,
P
h zn
h = 0 P
bn
h = 0
(NR) J(q) = 1 and ªn = ªn0; all n;n0;
Remarks
a) The timing of the model is the following: …rst, for given asset prices and
expected commodity prices traders exchange …nancial assets; then trader 1 chooses
an action n; and …nally, endowment (i.e., output) uncertainty is resolved, and
commodity trades are carried through. The important feature of this equilibrium
is that information is private even ex post, in the sense that the uninformed
trader does not get to observe trader 1’s action even after output uncertainty
is resolved. This is an equilibrium despite the fact that trader 2 may place a
positive probability on a zero probability event. Since there is no revelation of
information through prices and no information extraction through direct signals,
whatever prior trader 2 had, it is not revised. This depends on not having assumed
knowledge of preferences or common knowledge of the structure of the economy.
Below, we will remove this radical assumption and model ignorance of preferences
in a common knowledge environment.
b) The moral hazard interpretation arises for assets whose payo¤s ys are in-
creasing with s; and so are the endowments es
h. In this case, trader 1 can put in
‘e¤ort’ (n = 2) to increase the likelihood of high output (that is, high endowment
and high payo¤ for the investor), but he su¤ers the cost a2
1 > 0 of exerting high
e¤ort. If the asset price depended on the e¤ort level, trader 1 could manipulate
11the …nancial contract by claiming to exert high e¤ort, selling the asset at a higher
(by no arbitrage) price, and then use low e¤ort, and use the extra cash to buy a
position to hedge the endowment risk. Without nominal payo¤s, price equality
across n cannot in general be obtained.
c) In equilibrium the informed trader is not going to use his information,
although he is not forced to do so. Instead, this follows from asset market clearing
(bn
1 + bn
2 = 0) and from the measurability restrictions on prices and on trader 2’s
portfolio.
d) In the de…nition, we are assuming that trader 1 takes prices as given.
Since his trade may reveal his information (his e¤ort choice) through prices, the
plausibility of this assumption will be further discussed at the end of the paper.
e) Since the …nancial contract is generally not optimal for the uninformed,
as in Helpman and La¤ont, no incentive compatibility constraint is embedded
in the de…nition of equilibrium, except for implicitly requiring that the action n
exerted in equilibrium be optimal for the informed trader. Only when discussing
strategic behavior we will explicitly consider such a constraint. Condition (NR)
singles out equilibria where prices are e¤ort-independent. As discussed in the
Introduction, and further in Section 6, other equilibria may arise, provided they
satisfy an incentive compatibility condition.
f) As we will show later, we can see trader 1 as an entrepreneur himself facing
a moral hazard problem with a worker, and trying to hedge his cash-‡ows through
…nancial markets (see Section 4). One important consequence of existence is that
the entrepreneur has access to competitive hedging instruments. As we claimed in
the Introduction, these are not simply risk-free assets, but truly state-contingent
claims. Normally, the principal-agent models assume that the principal has access
to competitive credit markets to borrow at the risk-free rate without being bound
by his current wealth in the amount of payments to the agent. Here we extend
the access to guarantee that the principal can partially insulate his income from
output uncertainty. The degree of incompleteness limits the principal’s hedging
opportunities; however, hedging occurs more substantially than with a risk-free
asset. Note that in our equilibrium rank Y = I ¸ 2; and one can show through
a standard transversality argument that even in real terms ys;i=ps 6= ys0;i=ps0 for
all s;s0 with s 6= s0; all i, generically in the parameters of the model. So moral
hazard is not eliminated by trivially making the assets risk-free in real terms.
Similarly, one can show that equilibria are not always ‘low e¤ort’. Of course, the
issue remains of whether at least the principal can be made better o¤ when o¤ered
a nonlinear hedging contract. In this paper we only address feasibility, leaving
12the optimality to further research, other than what mentioned in Section 6.
The issue of existence amounts to asking whether ‘two economies’ (di¤erent at
the interim stage only through the informed trader’s action n, and hence through
the probabilities ¼n
1) have the same equilibrium prices. This is possible if the
Arrow security prices are identical in the ‘two economies’, a condition that we
guarantee when there are enough degrees of freedom, i.e., when there is enough
indeterminacy in the system of equations giving rise to an equilibrium, which in
turn is derived from the degree of market incompleteness. This is formally done
in the next section.
3. Existence of equilibrium
3.1. Modi…ed equilibrium
The above-de…ned equilibrium can be expressed as the equilibrium of an economy
where h = 2 is constrained in his portfolio choices, while h = 1 is unconstrained.
We use this observation in this section, where we slightly modify the de…nition of
equilibrium to an equivalent one, following the work of Balasko, Cass and Siconol…
[1], and similarly to what is done in Citanna and Villanacci [6].
To start, we look at an equilibrium by rewriting it as:







h = Y bn
h
for all n
Bhbh = 0 if h > 1
(M) markets clear, that is,
P
zh(n) = 0 P
bh(n) = 0
and (NR) Rq = 0;and ps1 = ps2; all s:
Here Bh is the (N¡1)I£NI matrix representing the measurability restrictions
on bh; and R is the (N ¡ 1)I £ NI matrix of price restrictions corresponding to
q1 = q2 (B2 = R; while B1 ´ 0).
We now describe the modi…ed equilibrium as a solution to a system of equa-
tions after transforming the informed agent using the ‘Cass’ trick’. A transformed
13equilibrium will be shown to be a modi…ed equilibrium, and this in turn a private
action equilibrium.
After transforming trader 1 in walrasian, the …rst order conditions for problem
(I); given prices and n, are expressed as
Dvn
1 ¡ !¸
nªn = 0 (1) P
¸
nªnzn
1 = 0 (2) (3.1)
with ! the appropriate Lagrange multiplier, and ¸
n 2 RS
++; all n. For all other










2Y + ¹2Bn = 0 (4) P
qnbn
2 = 0 (5a)
¡ªnzn
2 + Y bn
2 = 0 (5b)




2 is the multiplier associated with the …rst period budget constraint, and
¸
n
2 is the vector of Lagrange multipliers attached to the period 1 budget con-




h = 0 (7) P
h bn
h = 0 (8)
(3.3)
The informed trader chooses the unobservable action n comparing the indirect
utility at each n. This can be expressed in equations as
v2
1 ¡ v1
1 + " ¡ " = 0 (15)
min(";¼2
1) = 0 (16)
min(";1 ¡ ¼2
1) = 0 (17)
(3.4)
Note that this is arti…cial timing, and does not imply that the informed trader
…rst chooses n and then chooses bh. This choice is simultaneous, as in the stan-
dard principal-agent model. System (3.1) through (3.4) with condition (NR) has







for h = 2. Bn is the n-th supercolumn of B2, corresponding to portfolio restrictions relative to
action n.
14NS + NI + 1 ¡ (N ¡ 1)(S + I) too many unknowns, namely among p;q and ¸,
which nevertheless have to satisfy the arbitrage equation ¸
nY = qn; all n; further
reducing the degrees of freedom in the system to S¡(N ¡1)I+1. A precondition
for existence of a transformed equilibrium is that this number be nonnegative.
Since not all of the q and ¸ can be exogenized, contrary to what happens in Bal-
asko, Cass and Siconol… [1], we have to choose appropriate normalizations. After
setting p1;1 = 1; we use the following extra equations on q and ¸,
¸
nY ¡ qn = 0 (9)
¸
1;1 = 1 (10) P
s¸
s;1 ¡ (3 + I) = 0 (11)
(3.5)
and we construct a homotopy using the following equations:
(1 ¡ t)(qj;1 ¡ qj;2) + t(¸
i;1 ¡ 1) = 0; for 3 · i · 3 + I ¡ 1;j = i ¡ 2 (12)
(1 ¡ t)(
P
sps;1 ¡ 2) + t(¸
2;1 ¡ 1) = 0 (13)
(1 ¡ t)(ps;2 ¡ ps;1) + t(¸
s;2 ¡ ¸
s;1) = 0 (14)
(3.6)
Let the homotopy be the function H : ¥£T £¤££ ! Rl de…ned by the left-hand




















++ is the space of ¸
00 (the elements of ¸
1 not in ¸
0). Also, T = [0;1]; with
generic element t. Then H is a homotopy such thatH¸00;µ;t(») maps a boundaryless,
smooth manifold into a (boundaryless, smooth, connected) manifold of the same
dimension. If H
¡1
t (0) is a compact, boundaryless set, then deg2(H¸00;µ;t;f0g) is
well de…ned and equal for all t 2 T.
We will refer to the solutions to system of equations (3.1) to (3.6) at t = 0 as
modi…ed equilibria.
Lemma 3.1. Modi…ed equilibria are equilibria.
Proof. First, observe that if (1), (2), (15), (16) and (17) are satis…ed, then




1 = 0. The argument then is
a standard application of the Cass trick (see Balasko, Cass and Siconol… (1990)),
and therefore is omitted.
15Note that in system (3.1)-(3.6) we have to impose a restriction on S; that is:
S ¸ I + 3. This is not needed in order to establish Lemma 3.1, but it is required
in order to get existence using this homotopy.
3.2. A homotopy argument
The key step in the existence proof is to show properness of the projection pr :
H¡1(0) ! ¤ £ £; which we establish in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2. The projection pr : H¡1(0) ! ¤ £ £ is proper.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now we can state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 3.3. For any µ 2 £, if S ¸ I + 3; an equilibrium exists.
Proof. For the proof, we need to show that deg2(H¸00;µ;1;f0g) = 1. We will
do so by means of another, standard homotopy ~ H between two points in the
(path-connected) space of parameters ¤ £ £: This homotopy is de…ned by the
left-hand side of the same system (3.1)-(3.6) for t = 1; where we substitute for
any (¸




¤); the …rst being an arbitrary point, and the second being
our “test economy”. For any given ~ t 2 [0;1]; this homotopy is a map between
manifolds of the same dimension. It is proper, by an argument in all similar to
the proof of Lemma 3.2 when t = 1, and degree modulo 2 at f0g is well-de…ned.
For an appropriate choice of ¸
00¤ and µ
¤; thought in the bigger space RCSN
++ ; we
can show that deg2( ~ H¸00;µ;¸00¤;µ¤;t=1;~ t=0;f0g) = 1:
A) (a test economy). Let ¸
00¤ = 1; and choose a Pareto optimal allocation
ePO
h 2 RCSN
++ ; for all h: We can pick action-dependent endowments at this stage,
if we can (as we do) homotope them to action-independent ones. This Pareto
optimal allocation will have a corresponding unique (no trade) equilibrium, since
¸
1 = 1; ¸
2 = ¸
1; and q1 = q2 is the unique solution to equation (9).
To be precise, let ePO
h be the solution to this maximization problem: for given












2) ¸ vn (1) P
xn
h = rn (2)
(3.7)
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1 + ^ " ¡ ^ " = 0 (3)
min(^ ";1 ¡ ^ ¼
2
1) = 0 (4)
min(^ "; ^ ¼
2
1) = 0 (5)
(3.8)
Note that for each n, the maximization problem is strictly concave, and has a
unique solution, ^ xn
h; given by the system of equations
¼s;nDu1(^ x
s;n





2 ) ¡ ^ ps;n = 0





and which does not depend on ¼2
h; h = 1;2. In general, in this solution it is
not guaranteed that ^ x1
h = ^ x2
h: However, generically in (v;r); v2
1 ¡ v1
1 6= 0; by
a transversality argument, so without loss of generality we can pick a vector of
parameters such that v2
1 ¡v1
1 > 0; so that ^ ¼
2
1 = 1, uniquely, from (3) ¡(5); ^ " = 0
and ^ " = v2
1 ¡ v1
1.
Now from (3.9) it is not di¢cult to go back uniquely to system (3.1)-(3.6),
by setting en¤
h = (^ xn
h) as our choice of endowments (and recall, ¸




n = 1; ! = ^ p1;1; p1;1 = 1, pn1;1 = ^ pn1;1=^ p1;1;¸
n
2 = (^ p1;1¼n
2=µ
n
2)1; bh = 0;
¹2 = 0; ¼2
1 = ^ ¼
2
1, " = ^ "; and " = ^ " is a solution to (3.1)-(3.6), indeed the unique
one.
B) (regularity). We need to show that D» ~ H¸00;µ;¸00¤;µ¤;t=1;~ t=0; a square matrix
of derivatives, has full rank l. Note that individual excess demands are all zero.
We will show that
D» ~ H¸00;µ;¸00¤;µ¤;t=1;~ t=0¢» = 0 ) ¢» = 0
The argument is essentially standard, and only needs to be adapted to the par-
ticular system of equations we are looking into. It is therefore deferred to the
Appendix.
4. Extensions to a principal-agent setup
To make the model explicitly closer to the standard moral hazard setup, we should
allow trader 1 (the principal) to buy the information o¤ another individual (the
17agent), who is choosing the unobservable action n. Now the agent bears the cost
of the action, an
1. The agent is assumed to have no access to …nancial markets,











for each level of action n; where uA
1 is a standard smooth utility function (with










1 (x1P;¼1;L1(q)). We assume that uA
1 is unbounded from below, so that








1P ¡ [1 ¡ Á(wn
1)]e1) = Y bn













1 ¡ u ¸ 0
where wn
1 is the wage-utility if action n is implemented, 0 · Á(wn
1) · 1 (limited li-
ability)10 is the S-dimensional vector of wages, through the agent’s indirect utility
function Á; and u is the reservation utility level. Since the agent is forced to eat





1; his maximization problem is trivial,
and will be omitted. In the modi…ed equilibrium, system (3.1) is changed into
Dvn
1 ¡ !¸












1 )] = 0 (1c) P
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nªnzn















1 ¡ u) = 0 (2c)
(4.1)
and the remaining equations are the same. Here ®s;n 2 R, all s;n, and since
¯





1 ¡ u = 0; all n.
Then we have the following result, replicating Theorem 3.3.
10Limited liability for the principal could include his total wealth, both real and …nancial.
Here we assume for simplicity that the principal cannot provide salaries above output (the
endowment).
18Theorem 4.1. For any µ 2 £, if S ¸ I + 3; an equilibrium exists.
Proof. To prove existence, we need to show properness of the projection and to
…nd a test economy as we did before, in Theorem 3.3. While properness presents
no additional di¢culty, this time we need to specify parameters of the Pareto
optimum in order to guarantee the di¤erentiability of ~ H¸00;µ;¸00¤;µ¤;t=1;~ t=0.
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1 ¡ u ¸ 0 (2) P
s(¼s;n ¡ ¼s;n0)ws;n ¡ an
1 + an0



















1A) = 0 (2)
¯
n¼s;n + ±




s(¼s;n ¡ ¼s;n0)ws;n ¡ an
1 + an0
1 ) = 0 (4) P
s¼s;nws;n ¡ an
















and they map immediately to system (4.1), except for equation (1c). As before,
one can show that generically in (r;v;u) we can select a test economy such that
either ±














1 > 0;while ±
2 > 0: Also, generically the solution
cannot imply vP1
1 = vP2
1 ;and hence ¼2
1 = 1: Note that in the test economy, e1 =











1 . Hence 1 > Á(w
s;n
1 ); and equation (1c) is ®s;n = 0; all s;n.
We need to check that in this economy, rank of D» ~ H¸00;µ;¸00¤;µ¤;t=1;~ t=0 is full.
This is done in the Appendix.
Adding more principal-agent pairs can be easily accommodated and is left to
the reader.
195. Economies with common knowledge
As a …rst step to addressing the issue of implementability of our equilibrium,
we need to characterize our economy as an incomplete information environment.
The main element missing from the model in Section 2 and its extensions is
an assumption of common knowledge of the structure of the economy, which
allows to formally specify what exactly traders know and do not know in terms
of priors over the parameters of the economy, as opposed to over the actions of
other traders. Since complete knowledge of preferences would almost always lead
the uninformed trader to correctly predict the best reply n for given otherwise
uninformative equilibrium prices, we need to assume that uninformed traders do
not know the preferences of the informed traders. More precisely, we assume that
h = 2 does not know only the “cost” of the private action n. More formally,
we assume that uninformed traders have a prior over a2
1 (´ a; hereafter, …xing
a1
1 = 0). This prior is assumed to be a density function f : A ´ R ! R+. We take
the support of this prior to always include the tails of R, implicitly considering
that uninformed traders are not only uncertain about the cost of high e¤ort, but
also about whether it is a cost at all. Let F be the space of all such functions with
the compact-open topology. It is path-connected, since the convex combination
of two densities is still a density, and the condition on the tails is robust to convex
combinations.
Still considering the case so far analyzed of C = 1 and H = 2; we …rst go
back to the economy of Section 2. Trader h = 2 will now compute, for any
admissible ^ p ´ (pn;q) 2 RSN
++£R
I,11 trader 1’s optimal choice (as in (I)) of action
n given the type a2





I£A ! [0;1]: To make ¼n
1 into a function, we select a number
between zero and one whenever trader 1 is indi¤erent between actions. Then ¼n
2
is now derived, even in the case of uninformative prices ^ p, as a revised probability








An incomplete information economy now is a tuple (e;f;a;u;¼;Y ) and we consider
it parametrized by endowments, the cost of the action n = 2 and the prior f only.
Let µ = (e;a;f) 2 £ be an economy. A private action equilibrium is a vector
11That is, such that problem (I) has a solution. We restrict asset prices to be equal across
e¤orts n since we never relax this assumption, even in the homotopic economies.
20(¼1;(xh;bh)H
h=1;p;q) such that (I); (M) and (NR) are given as before, and (U) is
now:
given ^ p; and beliefs ¼n






2 = Y bn
2 for all n
and b2 is L2(^ p)¡measurable.
Here L2 represents the partition on n induced by prices and the prior f. Note
that, for each admissible ^ p; there is a unique a = a(^ p) such that 0 < ¼n
1(^ p;a(^ p)) <
1: Moreover, it is immediate to check that given the smoothness of the optimal
(x1;b1) as a function of ^ p; a(p) is a smooth function locally around each price ^ p.
Hence ¼n
2(^ p) is a continuous function of ^ p: Also, in equilibrium, since the support
of f contains the tails of R, ¼n
2(^ p) > 0; all n; consistently with the measurability
restrictions.
Given these properties we can prove existence of equilibrium adapting the
previous degree proof, as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. For any µ 2 £, if S ¸ I + 3; an equilibrium exists.
Proof. For ease of notation, we provide the proof for the case of the model
under Section 2. We can still use system (3.1)-(3.6) to characterize a modi…ed





Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 still can be shown to hold true without substantial modi…-
cation, and the proof is left to the reader. We can de…ne deg2(H¸00;µ;1;f0g) and
want to show that it is nonzero. To do this, we pick a test economy, which now
involves a speci…cation of ¸
00;e;a;f. Fixing ¸
00¤ = 1; choose the endowment en¤
that solves system (3.9), then choose a¤ such that system (3.8) yields v2
1 ¡v1
1 > 0;
so that ^ ¼
2
1(^ p;a¤) = 1, uniquely, from (3) ¡ (5); ^ " = 0 and ^ " = v2
1 ¡ v1
1: By con-
struction, a(^ p) 6= a¤. Now choose f(a) to be zero on an open ball Ba(^ p) centered
around a(^ p); and not containing a¤: Now ¼n
2(^ p) is uniquely determined, and we can
choose f such that ¼n
2(^ p) > 0; all n. Moreover, the function g(^ p;a) = ^ ¼
2
1(^ p;a)f(a)
is constant with respect to p around ^ p; therefore ¼n
2(^ p) also is, and its derivative
Dp¼n
2(^ p) = 0 at ^ p. The rest of the argument (uniqueness of the endogenous vari-
ables and regularity of the test economy) now follows as in Steps A and B of the
proof of Theorem 3.3, concluding our proof that deg2(H¸00;µ;1;f0g) = 1.
It is now obvious that a private action equilibrium can be seen as a private
information equilibrium for any incomplete information economy with properties
21as above. Note that it may well be the case that the uninformed trader’s ignorance
of the informed (dis)utility of the privately chosen action does not have to be
dramatic: the uninformed may indeed restrict his prior to a that entail a cost for
trader h = 1, especially in cases where the action chosen in equilibrium is not the
most preferred by the uninformed trader. The extension to economies of Section 4
is straightforward, provided we assume that the principal observes a, but …nancial
markets traders do not.
6. Fully strategic use of information: a discussion.
So far we have taken the rational expectations equilibrium perspective to focus
on the leading factor yielding the result, the endogenous uncertainty derived from
the presence of incomplete markets. This perspective implicitly assumes that
the informed trader has no control over the amount of information revealed by
prices. In other words, the informed trader is not exploiting the fact that, since
prices may reveal the information he has, he could try to control the amount of
revelation. In this scenario, the informed trader would not take prices as given,
and could possibly manipulate the …nancial contract this way. While abstracting
from the details of the price formation mechanisms may serve to highlight the
general mechanism leading to the coexistence of moral hazard and linear …nancial
contracts, conclusions would be severely limited if they were not sustainable by a
model of strategic use of information by the informed trader. The purpose of this
section is to illustrate a modelling alternative that would sustain our equilibrium
allocations in a strategic environment, and to discuss a few more scenarios and the
likelihood that they generate our competitive equilibrium as a strategic outcome.
For the sake of exposition, we once again use the setup of the economy of Sec-
tion 2. In all that follows, it is assumed that the number of uninformed traders
is large. The strategic models that we consider have embedded one or more ad-
ditional players, which we call the mediators (following Myerson [17], Ch. 6,
p.250). The mediator’s objectives and strategies, or the timing of his move, obvi-
ously determine the kind of strategic model we look at. We examine two di¤erent
setups.
A …rst modelling alternative consists in assuming that one mediator chooses
allocations as a function of messages sent by the traders (in a direct mechanism),
and that he moves …rst. This is the setup used in solving the (weak) implemen-
tation problem (see Myerson [17]). Let X be the feasible allocation space, and
F be the Social Choice Correspondence (SCC) associated with (one of) our pri-
22vate action equilibrium, and mapping the space A of utility of action/e¤ort into
the feasible allocation space. Note that for each economy, F is constant in the
allocation space. Hence it is immediate to see that F is weakly implementable.
Morever, let G be the SCS corresponding to the fully revealing equilibrium, satis-
fying the ex post incentive compatibility condition. Then, from Blume and Easley
[4], we know that there exists an open set of economies for which G is not weakly
implementable, since the information structure of the economy does not satisfy
the Non-Exclusivity condition. We conclude that there is at least an open set
of economies where the strong fully nonrevealing equilibrium is the only weakly
implementable outcome.
The trading game used to show weak implementability is quite unappealing
(the constant game). Therefore in what follows we construct an alternative trading
game, where the mediator essentially designs a mechanism where allocations are
not directly assigned to traders from their messages.
First, assume that the mediator decides prices, as functions from messages
~ A = A to functions from (RI)R £RI into (RS
++ £ RI), taking ~ a 7! p¤(b(a);~ a) =
(p(b;~ a);q(b;~ a)), where b = (b1(a);b2): The mediator posts them for the traders as
o¢cial terms oftrade. These functions are chosen tomaximize e0¡Eajj§hbh(a;p¤(:;~ a))jj;

























1(a;p¤(:;~ a);b2), and let
bn¤
1 (a;p¤(:;~ a);b2) be the correspondingly chosen asset portfolio. On the other
hand, let b2(p¤(:;~ a);b1(a)a) solve:
~ v2(p















and s.t. b2(:) is L2(p¤)¡ measurable (again, here ¼n
2 is the posterior probabil-
ity on N, given that p¤(:;~ a) is the announced function). Let the (pure strategy,
Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of this game be given by Bh(a;p¤(:;~ a)), for each h.
Then bh(a;p¤(:;~ a)) 2 Bh(a;p¤(:;~ a)); for all h: Note that b2(a;p¤(:;~ a)) may not de-
pend on a. Letting ~ v1(a;p¤(:;~ a)) be the value function for h = 1; while ~ v2(p¤(:;~ a))
be the value function for h = 2, the function p¤(b;~ a) must satisfy the additional
incentive compatibility constraint
~ v1(a;p




23The mechanism is the following: after p¤() is posted, trader 1 submits a message
~ a to the mediator, declaring his utility of the private action n, hence implictly
his preferred action; the mediator announces the corresponding prices, trader
1 chooses his optimal action, and traders submit their demands at those prices.
Traders will accept this mechanism since it o¤ers at least the level of utility derived
from the expected value of the endowment (the reservation utility of traders).
This mediator’s only concern is market clearing, so he will not try to extract
information from traders. In this game, the mediator faces a cost in holding
[selling] the asset (proportional to the excess supply [demand] of the asset), and
gets no bene…t from trading. Therefore trading for the mediator is a private
value exchange problem, since n does not a¤ect his pro…ts. We are assuming that
mediators are similar to brokers, in that they are barred from trading on their
account, and that competition prevents them from charging one-time commission
fees.12
In this game, it is feasible for the mediator to guarantee for himself the initial
wealth e0; since the private action equilibrium is a feasible pricing schedule. In
particular, the private action equilibrium is incentive compatible. Since e0 is the
maximum level of wealth the mediator can achieve, the private action equilibrium
is a (pure strategy, Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of the game (between mediator
and traders).13
The conclusions of this analysis are that: a) without restricting the class of
mechanisms, we are guaranteed the existence of one sustaining our competitive
12Dow and Gorton [8] suggests studying a similar brokerage institution acting as a mediator
between buyers and sellers. If instead we allowed the brokers to make pro…ts through trade, the
absence of bid-ask spreads in equilibrium could not immediately be justi…ed by simple Bertrand
competition among two exclusive brokers. That is, in this case it is not obvious that private
action equilibria will also be a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the trading game (deviations
to a bid-ask spread may be pro…table). Further inquiry in this direction will be the object of
future research. Also, observe that if the mediator dies before tomorrow, he has no independent
interest in hedging. A mediator working as an agent for the uninformed trader generally will
care about trading on his own account.
13The conclusions reached through these two games strongly depend on the timing of the
mediator’s move and his objective function. If the mediator moves after demands have been
submitted, taking this into account, traders may choose to submit demand functions to the
mediator, before he actually quotes a price (function). We can still assume (as in Jackson [10],
e.g.) that the mediator chooses a price that clears markets as his only objective. In this setup,
the mediator plays a more passive role and the informed agent now compares equilibria. It may
still happen that, for an open set of economies, the no-revelation trading strategy gives rise to
higher payo¤ to the informed trader when compared to the revelation strategy. This ultimately
depends on comparing welfare of equilibria with di¤erent degrees of revelation.
24equilibria as a strategic outcome; our private action equilibria are incentive com-
patible; b) further restricting the attention to trading games, we can …nd a rea-
sonable game form whose equilibria sustain allocations (and prices) of a private
action equilibrium, hence showing that the linear contracts are optimal in this
sense.
25A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.2
As v ! 1; we take a converging sequence f¸
00v;µ
vg ½ ¤££; and we will show
that f»
v;tvg has a converging subsequence. From equations (2), (5), (7) and (8),
eh À 0 and the boundary condition, we have fxv
hg converges to xh À 0. From
equations (15-17), we get convergence of f¼2v
1 g, and of the sequence f"vg: Since
T is compact, tv ! t (or a subsequence does; we ignore the distinction hereafter).
Then three cases are possible.
a) t = 0. In this case, from (1), (10) and p1;1 = 1; we get !v ! !: From (11)
and (13) we have that ¸
1v ! ¸
1 and p1v ! p1; and from (1), they must be both
strictly positive. Hence from (14), p2v ! p2 À 0; and from (1), ¸
2v ! ¸
2 À 0.
Now equation (9) implies that qv ! q. Equation (3) will give convergence of
f¸
nv
2 g; while equation (5) implies now the convergence of fbv
2g. It is immediate
to get convergence of f¹v
2g from (4) and of b1 from (8).
b) t = 1: When t = 1; H¸00;µ;1(») = 0 corresponds to a standard system for
a fully nonrevealing equilibrium, and properness of the projection follows from a
well-known argument.
c) 0 < t < 1. In this case observe that we still have convergence of f!vg. From









s;1 ¡ 2) + t(¸
2;1 ¡ 1) = 0
we have that fp1vg converges. Since both ¸
1 and p1 do, (1) implies that they are
both strictly positive. Now equation (9) for n = 1 implies that fq1vg converges,







2jj < 1; and similarly fp2vg ! p2; with jjp2jj <




and fp1vg are all bounded sequences of
positive numbers, and the left-hand side of the equation would go to in…nity, a
contradiction. The rest of the argument is now standard.
Proof of regularity in Theorem 3.3
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2qnT + Y T¢¸
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2 + BnT¢¹2 = 0 (4) P
qn¢bn
2 = 0 (5a)
¡ªn¢xn
2 + Y ¢bn
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2 = 0; using equations (10) through (14); with ¢q1 = ¢q2 = 0
using (9); and with ¢¼2
1 = ¢" = 0; ¢" = ¢v2
1 ¡ ¢v1
























h for all s;s0; all h:
Let h = 2: From (6) we have ¢¹T
















2 ¢¹2 = 0
Combining these expressions and using (5a), we get ¢bT






2diagY ¢b2 = 0
This, combined with (3) after dividing this last by ¸
n






















with In = I if n > 1; or equal to the same matrix after substituting its last row





























where last equality follows by multiplying equations (7) by ¢pn and summing
over n: If ¢xh 6= 0; some h; this contradicts negative de…niteness of Dvn2
h ; all h:
Therefore ¢xh = 0 all h: System A.1 together with ¢x = 0 leads to conclude that
¢» = 0:
Proof of regularity in Theorem 4.1
The only di¤erence from the previous argument revolves around equations
(4.1.1) to (4.1.2c), and equations (4.1.7), and their derivative with respect to the
relevant endogenous variables, which we rewrite below,
D2vn
1¢xn
1P ¡ (1ªn)T¢! + ¤n































1 = 0 (2a)
¢±




1 = 0 (2b) P
s¼s;n¢w
s;n











2 = 0; all (s;n) 6= (1;1) (7)
(A.2)
To show regularity, observe that from (1b); premultiplying by ¢w
s;n
1 ; summing













































Using (1a); premultiplying by (¢xn















































































































h 6= 0 or ¢w
s;n











1 < 0; contradicting (A.3). Then ¢xn
h = 0 and
¢w
s;n
1 = 0; all h and n.
As a consequence, using (1a) one can show that ¢! = 0; so that ¢p = 0:
From this we obtain that ¢» = 0; coming to the desired conclusion.
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